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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. COVINGTON, ] 
by and through its Co-Personal 
Representatives, Robert H. ] 
Covington and Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, ] 
Defendants and Appellants. ; 
) Case No. 930371CA 
) Priority (15) 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , Utah Code Annotated, and 
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
ISSUE I. Did an adjudication in a prior action (District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. C-89-339, between the 
identical parties to the present action and involving the same 
Uniform Real Estate Contract) that said contract was paid in full 
by defendants to the plaintiffs bar (under the doctrines of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel or otherwise) any further recovery 
on said contract by the plaintiffs from the defendants for property 
taxes and water assessment, which, if they were owing at all, were 
due and owing at the time of entry of the prior Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A grant of summary judgment is only 
proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining 
whether there is no genuine issue of material fact, all facts and 
inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party (in this case the defendants) against whom summary 
judgment is granted. In deciding if the trial court properly 
granted judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court7s view of the law, and will fully 
review the same for correctness. Utah State Coal, of Sr. Citizens 
v. U P & L. 776 P2d 632 (Utah 1989). The appellate court will also 
give no deference to the lower court7s legal conclusions concerning 
whether material facts are in dispute. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 
780 P2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989). 
Issue II. Is the Judgment of the District Court subject 
to collateral attack in the Circuit Court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The same as for Issue I above. 
ISSUE III. Was the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
terminated by payment in full so as to be no longer available to 
support a claim for taxes, water assessment, attorney fees or 
interest? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The same as for Issue I above. 
ISSUE IV. Were issues of material facts raised as to: 
(A) Was the issue of payment of taxes and water 
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assessments excluded as an issue from the trial of the District 
Court case? 
(B) Were the attorney fees reasonable, and can the 
court make that determination on affidavit without a hearing and 
without a supporting finding of fact? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The same as for Issue I above. 
ISSUE V. Did the court err in denying defendants7 Motion 
for Summary Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The same as for Issue I above, 
except that all facts and inferences therefrom should be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, against whom such 
Motion for Summary Judgment was sought. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHERE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. The plaintiffs brought this action 
in the lower court in July 1992 seeking judgment for real property 
taxes, water assessment and attorney7s fees pursuant to a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. (R. 1) The defendants denied owing the 
plaintiffs any such sums and asserted that the plaintiffs7 claims 
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
by virtue of a final adjudication in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, between the same parties on December 
18, 1991, in Case No. C-89-3339. (R. 12) 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, Both parties filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment (R. 37, 39) , which were served and filed together 
with supporting memoranda (R. 15, 41, 77) and affidavits (R. 47, 63 
and 72), which were duly argued to the court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. The court granted the 
plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 102) for the sum of 
$3,370.70, together with costs of $141.40, plus $3,127.50 
attorney's fees, plus interest on the sum of $3,440.70 at the 
"contract rate of 3/4's of one percent per month from May 8, 1992, 
until date hereof" on the Judgment and thereafter 12% per annum 
until paid. The court denied defendants7 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 102) Timely Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment (R. 
115) served and filed by defendants was denied, and this appeal was 
thereupon taken. (R. 117) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. On or about May 4, 1973, plaintiffs7 predecessors, 
Douglas B. Covington, and his wife, Alice H. Covington, as Sellers, 
sold to the defendants, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
a tract of land in Salt Lake County consisting of approximately 2.5 
acres, together with five shares of irrigation company water stock. 
(R. 30) 
B. As a part of the same transaction, Douglas B. 
Covington and defendant, John C. Josephson, entered into a written 
Addendum to the said Uniform Real Estate Contract, whereby the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was amended to provide for a right-of-
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way to the property being purchased by the Josephsons across a 
tract being retained by Douglas Covington and his wife. (R. 25, 51) 
C. The Josephsons paid on that Contract for 
approximately fifteen years. During that time Mrs. Covington died 
(in 1981) and her interest passed to her husband, Douglas B. 
Covington, as they held the property as joint tenants, and in 1987 
Mr. Covington also died and was succeeded in ownership of the 
property by the plaintiffs. (R. 25, 51) 
D. After the property was paid off and the time had 
come to convey the property to the Josephsons, the plaintiffs 
refused to convey the right-of-way and asserted that the Josephsons 
had no right-of-way. The Josephsons (defendants) refused to accept 
that position, recorded a Notice of Interest asserting their right 
to the right-of-way and continued to use the right-of-way as they 
had for some fifteen or more years before. (R. 25, 51) 
E. In about May of 1989 plaintiffs in the present 
action commenced a suit against the Josephsons (defendants in this 
action and in the prior action) in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Case No. C-89-3339, seeking a quiet title 
determination that the property which the Covingtons had retained 
was not subject to a right-of-way, for damages for slander of title 
against the Josephsons (defendants) for filing the Notice of 
Interest, for trespass on the grounds that the Josephsons 
(defendants) continued to use the old right-of-way without the 
right to do so, and for an injunction restraining the Josephsons 
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(defendants) from continuing to use the right-of-way. The 
Josephsons (defendants) counterclaimed in that action against the 
plaintiffs asking the court therein to quiet title in them to a 
nonexclusive right-of-way across the property retained by the 
Covingtons leading from Danish Road to the north side of their 
property, together with five shares of water stock, together with 
the determination that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was "fully 
paid and performed by defendants, and defendants are entitled to 
conveyance" of the property. The defendants also sought 
determination that plaintiffs' refusal to convey the right-of-way 
was without merit and that they were entitled to attorney's fees 
under 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated. The Josephsons (defendants) 
also sought attorney's fees based upon the attorney's fee provision 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and Josephsons (defendants) 
also sought damages for plaintiffs' unlawful attempt to obstruct 
the right-of-way. (As noted, the plaintiffs and the defendants in 
Case No. C-89-3339 were identical to the plaintiffs and the 
defendants in the present action, and both actions involved the 
same Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R. 25, 51, 30, 47) 
F. In the District Court action the plaintiffs filed a 
Reply to the Counterclaim, in which plaintiffs "deny that the 
defendants have performed said obligations" under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, admitted that, upon full performance, defendants 
would be entitled to a conveyance under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract of the 2.5 acres which they purchased, but without the 
-6-
right-of-way, and otherwise generally denied the allegations of the 
Counterclaim and asserted, by way of affirmative defenses, statutes 
of frauds, unclean hands, lack of consideration and statute of 
limitations. (R. 47) 
G. The District Court case was tried to the court 
without a jury, Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, in June 
1991, and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were 
ultimately entered on December 18, 1991, quieting title in the 
Josephsons to the 2.5 acres and awarding them the claimed right-of-
way and $4,000 attorney fees. (R. 25, 51) Also, in paragraph 6 of 
the said Findings of Fact in said prior District Court case, the 
court found that the said Uniform Real Estate Contract has been 
"paid in full." (R. 54) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
In the current action commenced in the Circuit Court of 
Salt Lake County plaintiffs seek a judgment for arrears of taxes 
and water assessment plus attorney,s fees based on a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. The said Uniform Real Estate Contract was the 
subject to prior litigation between the same parties in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, and in that action the court 
made a finding that the said Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid 
in full." Both cases dealt with the issue of payment of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, both cases involved the same parties 
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and therefore, under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel, the Circuit Court action is barred. 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
The plaintiffs are attempting in the present Circuit 
Court action to collaterally attack the Findings and Judgment in 
the prior District Court action, wherein the court found that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid in full." The Judgment of 
the District Court is only subject to review on appeal or by direct 
attack under Rule 60(b). The Judgment is clear, complete and 
unambiguous on its face and is certainly not subject to collateral 
attack in an inferior court. 
POINT III. THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, HAVING BEEN 
FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL BY THE DISTRICT COURT, IS 
TERMINATED AND NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR TAXES, 
WATER ASSESSMENT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Where the District Court found in the First Case that the 
defendants had fully performed and that the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was "paid in full," the contract is terminated, and there 
is no further obligation of the defendants which they could 
possibly breach and which could possibly be the subject of a 
subsequent cause of action relating to payment of that same 
contract. 
POINT IV. AT THE VERY LEAST, FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST AS 
RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES. 
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At the very least, the Affidavit of John C. Josephson 
raised issues of fact, to-wit, whether the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was paid in full; whether or not there was any reservation 
of issues in the First Case; as to the reasonableness of attorney's 
fees; and as to whether they can be awarded on affidavit; these 
issues of fact preclude summary judgment. 
POINT V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
If the plaintiffs' action is barred by res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, impropriety of collateral attack, or upon the 
allegation that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was fully paid and 
thus terminated, then defendants were entitled to summary judgment, 
and the court erred in denying defendants summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Schaer v. State 
bv & Through Dept. of Transportation, 657 P2d 1337 (Utah 1983), set 
forth at page 1340 the rules governing the law applicable to res 
judicata and collateral estoppel as follows: 
"There are certain distinctions to be made in the 
application of the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. In order to determine which 
doctrine is to be properly applied, one must focus on 
whether the second claim, demand, or cause of action is 
different from that of the first: 
fl/In order for res judicata to apply, both suits 
must involve the same parties or their privies and also 
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the same cause of action; and this precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated 
as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the 
prior action . . . , 
fl/Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises 
from a different cause of action and prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the 
second suit that were fully litigated in the first 
suit.'" 
In said citation the court is quoting from Searle Bros. 
v. Searle, 588 P2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
The elements of res judicata are thus defined to be: 
1. The same parties (or privies); 
2. The second claim, demand or cause of action is the 
same as the first; 
3. Issues that could have been litigated are barred as 
well as those that were in fact litigated in the prior action. 
The elements of collateral estoppel are: 
1. The same parties (or privies); 
2. Different causes of action; 
3. Facts and issues litigated in the first suit cannot 
be relitigated in the second. 
Res judicata clearly appears to be a bar in this case, 
and we will analyze the present Circuit Court action ("Second 
Case") and the prior District Court action of "The Estate of 
Douglas B. Covington, by and through its Co-Personal 
Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiffs, vs. John C. Josephson and Geraldine C. Josephson, 
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Defendants," Case No. 89-3339 ("First Case11) , item by item: 
1. The same parties (or privies): 
The parties in both cases are identical with no deviation 
whatsoever; 
2. The same cause of action: 
In the First Case, defendants asked in their Counterclaim 
that the Uniform Real Estate Contract be declared paid in full, and 
plaintiffs denied that it was paid in full. The court found in the 
First Case that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid in 
full." In the Second Case plaintiffs claim that taxes and water 
assessments were still owing under that contract and that therefore 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was not paid in full. 
3. Issues that could have been litigated or that were in 
fact litigated are barred. 
The issue of whether the Uniform Real Estate Contract was 
paid in full was tried in the First Case and the court found in 
Finding of Fact No. 6 that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was 
"paid in full." But even if that were not so, the taxes and water 
assessments claimed in the Second Case were for the years 1989, 
1990 and 1991 and therefore could have been litigated and included 
in the Judgment entered in the First Case in December of 1991. 
Even if res judicata did not apply, under the collateral 
estoppel doctrine: 
1. The parties are the same. 
2. The fact or issue of payment of the Uniform Real 
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Estate Contract was tried in the First Case and a finding of 
payment in full duly entered. 
Had there been any sum owing to plaintiffs for principal, 
interest, insurance, taxes assessment or otherwise, the plaintiffs 
were not obliged to convey anything to the defendants. The court 
specifically found that nothing further was owing and quieted title 
to the subject property and the right-of-way in the defendants. 
Therefore, under either doctrine, it is clear that the 
issue of payment of the Uniform Real Estate Contract was tried and 
determined in the First Case and is barred in the Second Case. 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
As noted in Point I, the undisputed facts compel the 
conclusion that the Judgment in the First Case is a bar to the 
Second Case. The plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the foregoing by 
apparently claiming that the Findings and Judgment entered in the 
First Case don't mean what they say, asserting that it was not 
intended that the District Court Findings and Judgment include the 
payment of taxes and water assessment, notwithstanding the language 
employed in the Findings clearly and unequivocally state that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid in full." As noted above, 
had there been any sum owing to the plaintiffs for any reason, 
whether principal, interest, insurance, taxes or assessment, the 
defendants would not have been entitled to judgment quieting title 
in them to the subject property and right-of-way, and the court 
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would have declined to quiet the title in defendants, and certainly 
would not have made a finding that the contract was "paid in full." 
The payment of taxes and water assessments is as much a 
responsibility of the buyer under a uniform real estate contract as 
is the payment of principal and interest, and the buyer is not 
entitled to conveyance of the property until all sums owing have 
been paid in full. 
The plaintiffs' attempt to obtain a judgment for taxes 
and water assessment in the Second Case in the Circuit Court is a 
collateral attack upon the decree of the District Court in the 
First Case and is not proper. The plaintiffs attempt by affidavit 
to assert that the issue of payment of taxes and water assessment 
was excluded from the District Court Judgment. Neither the 
Findings nor the Judgment in the First Case, however, contains any 
such reservation, but to the contrary purport to be a total and 
complete adjudication of all issues existing between the parties. 
The defendants categorically deny that there was any such 
reservation of said issue, and defendant, John C. Josephson, 
unequivocally states in his Affidavit (R. 47) as follows: 
"2. That I fully performed my duties under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, making the final payment May 18, 1989 . . . 
"4. . . . I further state that my Answer filed in 
that action alleged full performance of the contract by 
me, and Plaintiffs7 Reply denied such performance, and 
that issue was directly tried by the District Court, 
giving rise to the above-quoted Finding." 
If it is the plaintiffs' position that the Findings and 
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Judgment in the District Court case were in any way in error, then 
plaintiffs sole remedy was appeal, or a direct attack upon the 
Judgment under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Certainly the Circuit Court is not entitled to ignore the 
unambiguous Judgment of a superior court or entertain any kind of 
a collateral attack upon it. 
In 46 Am Jur 2nd, Judgments, Section 621, it states in 
relevant part: 
"The general rule is that a judgment is not subject 
to collateral attack where the court had jurisdiction of 
the subject matter and of the parties or, in proceedings 
in rem, of the res." 
There is no dispute in this action that the District 
Court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. 
The Findings and Judgment are complete and unambiguous, and as 
stated in the Utah case of Erickson v. McCoullough, 91 Ut 159, 63 
P2d 595 (1937), at page 599: 
"The probate court having acquired jurisdiction of 
a cause, its orders and judgments are presumed to be 
based upon evidence, stipulations or proceedings 
sufficient to support such orders or judgments." 
and goes on to point out that any objection is "'available only on 
direct application to the same court, or on appeal.,n (quoting from 
Section 102-1-8 R.S. Utah 1933.) The same is true in this case. 
Furthermore, the Judgment of the District Court in the 
First Case is clear and unambiguous when it declares the contract 
paid in full and quiets title to the subject property and right-of-
way in the defendants, which it could not legally have done if any 
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sum was found to be owing. Therefore, although a judgment, like 
any other instrument, may be subject to parol evidence if it is 
ambiguous upon its face, the District Court Judgment in this action 
is not ambiguous on its face and is not subject to the introduction 
of parol evidence to attempt to explain it. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs are precluded from attempting to 
vary the clear meaning of the Findings and Judgment by attempting 
to introduce any alleged collateral agreements or understandings 
between the parties as to the scope of the Judgment, It is stated 
at 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, Section 72: 
"If, on the other hand, the judgment is not 
ambiguous or uncertain, the parol evidence rule applies, 
and the written judgment should be accepted at its face 
value and without speculating as to the reasoning 
employed in reaching the particular result." 
POINT III. THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, HAVING BEEN 
FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL BY THE DISTRICT COURT, IS 
TERMINATED AND NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR TAXES, 
WATER ASSESSMENT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The District Court found that the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was "paid in full," which means that the defendants have 
fully performed all of their obligations under the contract, and 
they cannot now be found to be deficient so as to support a claim 
for taxes, water assessments, interest or attorney's fees. If the 
contract has been paid in full, there is nothing further in the 
contract to be breached by the defendants. 
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It is axiomatic that where a contract has been paid in 
full, there can be no breach thereof as to payment. Or viewed 
another way, once the contract has been paid, it is terminated and 
discharged. In 17A Am Jur 2d, Section 539, it states: 
"A contract may be discharged by performance in 
accordance with its terms, and this is the normal 
termination of every contract." 
By analogy, where a contract has been rescinded, there can be 
no award of attorney7 fees based thereon. BLT Investment Company 
v. Snow. 586 P2d 456 (Utah 1978). 
POINT IV. AT THE VERY LEAST, FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST AS 
RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES. 
Even if the defendants are in error on the points 
previously asserted herein, at the very least the Affidavit of 
defendant, John C. Josephson raises factual issues which would have 
to be tried by the court. As noted above, the defendant, John 
Josephson, clearly states in his Affidavit: 
"2. That I fully performed my duties under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs7 
Complaint, making the final payment May 18, 1989 . . . 
"4. . . . I further state that my Answer filed in 
that action alleged full performance of the contract by 
me, and Plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and 
that issue was directly tried by the District Court, 
giving rise to the above-quoted Finding." 
It is clear that the defendants in their Answer in the 
present case deny any liability to the plaintiffs, (R. 12) thus 
presenting an issue for trial. Plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary 
Judgment was not supported by affidavits when served and filed 
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herein. Therefore no counteraffidavit was required by defendants. 
Nevertheless, the defendants served and filed an Affidavit by 
defendant, John C. Josephson (R. 47), asserting that the contract 
was paid in full and asserting that the issue of full performance 
was tried by the court. Only thereafter did plaintiffs serve and 
file the Affidavit of plaintiff, Mary C.Whetman, and the Affidavit 
of plaintiffs' attorney, David K. Broadbent. (R. 63, 72) These 
affidavits do no more that oppose the Affidavit of defendant, John 
C. Josephson, and at most create fact issues which preclude summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs' Affidavits were 
served one day before the oral argument and are clearly untimely 
for any purpose other that in opposition to defendant's Affidavit. 
Furthermore, as noted above, in determining whether 
there is a genuine issue of material fact, all facts and inferences 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
(in this case the defendants) against whom summary judgment is 
granted. Utah State Coal, of Sr. Citizens v. U P & L, supra. On 
appeal, no deference shall be given to the lower court's legal 
conclusions concerning whether material facts are in dispute. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, supra. 
The plaintiffs refer to a letter (R. 87) by Robert C. 
Cummings, counsel for defendants in the First Case, in which Mr. 
Cummings at most acknowledges that he received certain tax notices 
from plaintiffs' attorney and that he would take them up with his 
clients when his clients returned from an out-of-town trip. The 
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plaintiffs attempt to convert that simple letter into an admission 
made on behalf of the defendants that they owed the taxes. By no 
stretch of the imagination can that letter be so construed. Even 
if the letter contained a "promise" made on behalf of defendants to 
pay the taxes, there is no consideration to support it. But in any 
event it cannot be said to do more than raise an issue of fact. 
It should be noted that the plaintiffs have not stated a 
cause of action for quantum meruit, and even if, under some version 
of the facts, the plaintiffs were able to assert an equitable right 
to reimbursement to any part of the claimed taxes or assessment, 
the plaintiffs would be required to amend and assert such a claim, 
and defendants are entitled to a trial on that issue. It is 
certainly not the proper subject for summary judgment, and of 
course it should be noted that even if the plaintiffs were able to 
assert a claim in quantum meruit, they would not be entitled to 
attorney's fees or interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Finally, the court awarded attorney's fees based only on an 
affidavit, without an evidentiary hearing and without a finding of 
fact. There remains therefore an issue of the reasonableness of 
the attorney's fees. Our Supreme Court has held that attorney's 
fees may not be awarded in the absence of a hearing and a finding 
of fact unless the parties stipulate otherwise. See the case of 
Provo City Corporation v. Cropper. 28 Ut 2d 1, 497 P2d 629 (1972) : 
" . . . unless the parties agree otherwise, the 
court is obliged to take evidence on the issue of the 
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reasonableness of the attorney's fees and to make 
findings thereon." 
POINT V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
If the defendants are correct in their arguments made in 
Points I, II and III above, or any of them, then summary judgment 
should have been granted in the defendants' favor and against 
plaintiffs on the grounds of res judicata, or collateral estoppel, 
or the impropriety of a collateral attack in the Circuit Court upon 
the District Court Judgment, or that the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract has been fully performed and is terminated, and defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment. The defendants believe that 
Points I and II are correct and controlling and that summary 
judgment should therefore have been awarded to them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the 
Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants 
must be reversed, and defendants' Summary Judgment against the 
plaintiffs should be granted or, at the very least, the matter 
should be remanded for trial in the Circuit Court on the issues 
of fact referred to above. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorney for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Appellants' Brief was mailed to 
David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for the 
plaintiffs and appellees, at their address, City Centre I, Suite 
900, 175 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, postage prepaid, 
this day of December, 1993. 
Attorney for the Defendants 
-20-
ADDENDUM 
Document Page of Record 
Complaint 1 
Answer 12 
Judgment of District Court 25 
Uniform Real Estate Contract 29 
Affidavit of Defendant, John C. Josephson . . . . 47 
Exhibit A. Draper Bank Ledger 50 
Exhibit B. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 51 
Letter from Robert C. Cummings 87 
Order and Judgment 102 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Thomas M. Melton (4999) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
The plaintiffs, Robert H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman, 
the co-personal representatives of the Estate of Douglas B. 
Covington, complain and allege against defendants as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4. 
2. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-13-1 and 78-13-4. 
r?,,.. 
••: C si 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge PwP— 
E. YEATES 
DZAHLEA 
• i, suit* 900 ; 
fourth South 
Ak« City 
»84111 
524-1000 
PARTIES 
3. Plaintiffs Robert H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman 
(collectively the "Covingtons") are Personal Representatives for 
the Estate of Douglas B. Covington. 
4. Defendants John C. and Geraldine C. Josephson 
(collectively the "Josephsons") are husband and wife and are 
residents of Salt Lake County. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
5. On or about May 4, 1973 Douglas B. and Alice H. 
Covington (the "Covingtons") entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (the "Contract"). A copy of the Contract is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". 
6. Under the terms of the Contract, the Covingtons 
agreed to sell and the Josephsons agreed to buy the property 
described as follows: 
BEG. at a point N 89°54,10" W 1320 ft fr the 
SE cor of Sec 35, T2S, R1E, SLB&M, and running 
th N 0°10f23l W 505.475 ft to a point on an 
old barbed wire fenceline; thence N 86°34l10" 
W 265.41 ft; th S 20°15' E 555.567 ft to the S 
line of said Sec 35, th along said S line S 
89°54,10" E 74.17 ft to point of beg. 
7. The contract also provides for the payment of taxes 
and assessments on the property as follows: 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments of every kind and nature which are 
or which may be assessed and which may become 
due on these premises during the life of this 
agreement. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes 
after May 4, 1973. 
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:E, YEATES 
LDZAHlEft 
tr« I, Suit* 900 
t Fourth South 
U k « City 
ih 84111 
) 524-1000 
8. The Worthingtons have failed to pay, and continue 
to refuse to pay the outstanding taxes and assessments upon the 
Property, including taxes in the amount of $3,377.15, water share 
assessments in the amount of $63.55 and other sums due and owing 
under the terms of the Contract. Under the terms of the 
Contract, the Covingtons have paid these outstanding amounts, 
together with interest. The Covingtons are entitled to be 
reimbursed for these sums paid on behalf of the Worthingtons. 
9. On or about June 5, 1992, the Covingtons informed 
the Worthingtons in writing of the payment of taxes and 
assessments. The letter demanded that the Worthingtons repay the 
Covingtons for the unpaid taxes and assessments. A true and 
correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "3". 
10. Alice C. Covington died on December 17, 1981, and 
upon her death, all of her interest passed to Douglas B. 
Covington. Douglas B. Covington died on September 27, 1987. 
Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of the Estate of 
Douglas B. Covington. 
11. The Contract further provides that in the event 
either party to the Contract defaults in any of its covenants or 
agreements, the defaulting party shall pay all costs, expenses 
and attorneys' fees which arise or accrue from enforcing the 
Contract. Contract, 1F 21. 
CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract) 
12. Paragraphs 1 through 11 above are incorporated 
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herein as though fully set forth. 
13. The Covingtons have performed each of their 
obligations under the Contract and each condition precedent to 
the entitlement of plaintiffs to the relief sought in this Count 
has been performed or has occurred. 
14. The Worthingtons have failed and refused and 
continue to fail and refuse to pay the outstanding taxes and 
assessments on the Property though required to do so under the 
terms of the Contract. 
15. The Worthingtons' actions amount to a breach of the 
Contract and the Worthingtons are therefore liable to the 
Convingtons for an amount equal to the unpaid taxes and 
assessments, plus interest at the amount set forth in the 
Contract accruing through the date of the Covington's receipt of 
such amount and all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred 
by the Covingtons in their attempts to enforce the Contract. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants 
as follows: 
1. For judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against 
defendants in an amount equal to the taxes and assessments paid 
by the plaintiffs on behalf of the defendants, together with all 
interst accruing through the date of payment of such amounts, 
expenses and attorney's fees incurred by plaintiffs in their 
efforts to mitigate their damages and enforce the Contract. 
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2. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
appropriate. u 
DATED this 2 day of July, 1992. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent 
Thomas M. Melton 
Attdrniys for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
941 Statice Avenue 
Sandy, UT 84070 
4898F 
:C YEATES j 
LDZAHLER 
\r% I, Suite 900 
t Fourth South 
Uk« City 
•h 84111 
) 524-1000 ii 
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GORDON A. MADSEN, No. 2043 
Attorney for the Defendants 
West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone 298-6610 
6F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAi<F CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B., 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Wheaton, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
Come now the defendants and answer plaintiffs1 Complaint 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Said Complaint fails to state a claim against 
defendants upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Admit the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
except deny that a copy of said contract was attached to said 
Complaint. 
3. Admit the allegations of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. 
4. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 8 and 9. 
ANSWER 
Civil No. 920009436CV 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
5. Admit the allegations of paragraph 10. 
6. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 
and 15, except allege that the Uniform Real Estate Contract speaks 
for itself. 
7. Deny each and every other allegation of said 
Complaint not hereinabove specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
8. Plaintiffs1 Complaint is barred by the principles 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the Final Judgment in 
the case of "The Estate of Douglas B. Covington, by and through 
its Co-Personal Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C. 
Whetman, Plaintiff, vs. John C. and Geraldine C. Josephson, 
Defendants," Civil No. C-89-3339, entered in this action on or 
about December 18, 1991, bars this action in its entirety. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment dismissing 
plaintiffs1 Complaint, for costs, and for such other relief as is 
just to be granted in the premises. 
RDON A. MADSEN 
ttorney for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer was mailed 
to David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for the 
plaintiffs, at their address, 175 East Fourth South, #900, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this J$ -~- day of 
August, 1992. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
POBERT C. CUMKINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Defendants 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
6F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B., 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Cc-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPH SON, 
Defendants, 
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the 
19th day of June, 1991, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
District Court Judge. The plaintiffs appeared in person and 
by and through their attorneys, David K. Broadbent and Sally 
McKinimee, and the defendants appeared in person and by and 
through their attorney, Robert C. Cummings. The Court heard the 
opening arguments cf counsel and the evidence presented during 
plaintiffs1 case in cnief, and the parties stipulated with regard 
to certain testimony as set forth in the record, and the parties 
having further stipulated that the matter of attorneys fees be 
reserved for determination after the trial. The defendants made a 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-89-3339 
Judge Richard B. Moffat 
motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiffs1 case in 
chief, and the court determined that, based upon the facts and 
law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their Complaint 
and determined that defendants are entitled to the right-of-way as 
hereinafter set forth, and the matter of attorney's fees having 
been presented by affidavit and argument of counsel for the 
parties conducted on October 25, 1991, and the Court, being 
advised in the premises, and the Court, having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. The defendants and their heirs and assigns forever 
are owners in fee simple of the following-described real property 
in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 541 10" West 1320 feet 
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running 
thence North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet to a point on 
an old barbed wire fence line; thence North 86° 34' 10" 
West along an existing fence line 265.41 feet; thence 
South 20° 15'East 555.567 feet to the South line of said 
Section 35; thence along said South line South 89° 54' 
10" East 74.17 feet to the point of beginning. 
Less the following-described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1374.47 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 89° 54' 10" West 10.88 feet; thence 
North 20° 15' West 155.99 feet to the Southeast corner 
of Lot 12, Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence North 20° 
15' West 317.95 feet to'the Northeast corner of Lot 10, 
Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence South 89° 42' 07" East 
12.03 feet to fence line; thence South 19° 56' East 
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along fence line 316,93 feet; thence South 20p 30' East 
along fence line 156.57 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with the following described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" Wesr 1320.00 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 89° 54' 10" West 54.47 feet to 
fence line; thence South 20° 30' East along fence line 
6.41 feet to fence corner? thence South 89° 54' 10" East 
along fence line 52.24 feet; thence North 0° 10* 23" 
West 6.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress 
to and egress from the aforesaid tracts described in this 
paragraph 1 of this Judgment over the following-described tract: 
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 
feet and North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 
86° 341 10" West along an existing fence line 125 feet, more 
or less, to the west boundry of existing entrance way to 
defendants' real property hereinabove described in this 
paragraph 1 of this Judgment; thence North 0° 10' 23" West 15 
feet; thence South 86° 34' 10" East 125 feet, more or less, 
to the Fast boundry of plaintiffs' property described in 
paragraph 3 below; thence South 0° 10' 23" East 15 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
If plaintiffs or their heirs or assigns forever elect to 
maintain a locked gate across said right-of-way, a key 
thereto will be furnished at all times by the party 
maintaining said locked gate to defendants and their heirs, 
and assigns forever. 
2. The defendants are owners of five (5) shares of Big 
Willow Irrigation Company water stock, which have been delivered 
to them. 
3. Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever are 
owners in fee simple of the following-described real property in 
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Salt Lake County, Utah, subject only to the non-exclusive right-of-
way referred to in paragraph 1 above: 
Eeginninc at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 
1320.00 feet ar.5 North 00s 10f 23" West 503.475 feet 
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence North 86° 34* 10" West along an existing 
fence line 265,41 feet; thence North 20° 15' 00M West 
312.53 feet; thence South 89° 54' 19" East 372.18 feet; 
thence South 00° 10' 23" East 308.48 feet to the point 
of Beginning. 
4. The defendants are awarded attorney's fees in the 
amount of $4,000.00, together with their costs of court of $74.00. 
DATED this 1 £> day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
The foregoing Judgment 
approved as to form: 
DAVID H. EROADBENT 
SALLEY McMINIMEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
F0B2r^C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for Defendants 
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FHIS IS A LfG^Uf ItNDiNG COwTKACf If NOT UNOfcKSTOOO S££* COM/>feTfcNi A0viCe* 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
l . THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this . 4tfr . day of _ -Mjtt 1973 , A D . 19 -
DOUGLAS B . COVINCTQN AND ALICE H. COVINGTON aka ALICE HANSEN COVINGTON by and between 
hereinafter d e b a t e d a , the Seller, and JOttN C , J O S * P H S O N AND G F R A L D I N H C T J O S E P M S C t U 
hia wi fe , as j n t ten and not as ten in comnon, with f u l l r i g h t s of survivorshipp 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of S a l t L a k e C l t V , U t a h 
;J 
i 
i ; 
•Ijll 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, fur the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, . j 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the fuilowing described real property, situate in 
.Sfllt l ak r the county of . State of Utah, to-wit: . 
I! Moie particularly desenbed as follows: 
BBS .at a point N 89°54 ,10 , t W 1320 f t f r th«? SE cor of Sec 35 , T2S, 
R1E, SLB&M and runnino th N 0°10 t 23" W 505.475 f t t o a n o m t on an old barbed 
wire f e n c c l i n e ; thence N 86°34«10" W 265.41 t t ; th S 20D15 • E 555#56? f t | ! | 
to th? £ l i n e of sa id Sec 35; th along sa id S l i n e S a9 o 54 , 10 n E 74.17 f t 
to point of beg* 
5 
TOGETHER WITH X shares of Bdg Willow I r r i g a t i o n water s t ock . 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of 
S I C T ^ S N THOUSAND r i G H T HUNDRED T H I R T Y A N D N O / 1 0 0 - - - ~ Dollars ^ 6 , 8 3 0 ^ 0 0
 } (Hi 
DRAPER BANK AMTl T R U S T I payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order . i! 
strictly within the following times. W-w.t: T H 3 F S THOUSAND W D N Q / 1 0 0 -. 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of < 1 * 
( | 3 , 0 0 0 „ 0 Q } 
. shall be paid a* follows: 
i | l 
$107#C0 or more per month commencing June 10, 1973 *nd monthly thereafter 
until principal balance together with accrued interest has been paid in full. 
Any payment that becomes 15 days or more delinquent shall be charged a $5»00 j 
per month late charge. «, 
Mr. Covington shall retain use of bldgs on property for a period of 10 years, 
if desired, j, 
Buyer agrees to not hold seller liable for any future problems or litigationj 
with regard to boundary line discrepancy between survey and existing fence line 
Seller agrees to assist buyer in any way possible to resolve problem. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 4Ltu day of May 1 9 7 3 ID 
4. Said monthly payments arc to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from 5—4—73
 o n A | | unpaid portions of the 
_&\5L . per cent ( flff,. » r r) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, •' J purchase price at the rate of . . . _ . . . ._ ... . 
may pay amounU in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpatd balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is mude. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract a* to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
none 
with an unpaid balance of 
_, as of . 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
u e s now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following nrrnp 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed fi percent 
U -rA ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; j that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to l« 
made r>y the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loan* m d mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and m trtgagea. 
9. If the Buyer desire* to exercis* his right through accelerated paymenu under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations out funding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the J' Iyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior ohltgutiuns. Prepayment penalties in respect 
o obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, snail ' 
aid wbligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
be paid by seller unless 
10 The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hi r ' agrees to apply tiny amount so received upon " 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers requu . pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob- I 
taming . loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one half, provided however, that the monthly paymenu and ) 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. i 
11. The ..« yer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed ! 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees ; 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: j 
none i 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
12. The Buyer arret* to pay the general taxes after . 5 - 4 -
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep a)) insurable buildings and improvement* on »aid premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable lo the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ TSL*. 
and to assign said insurancr to the Seller as hit intereata may api*ar and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
J4 In the event the Buyer ahall default in thr payment of any s o c i a l or general taxes, assessment* or insurance 
premium* as herein provided, thr Seller may, at his option, pay aaid taxes. assessment* and insurance premium* or cither 
of thrni. and if Seller elect* so to do, then the fiuver agree* to repay lh«« Seller upon demand, all such aunt* ao advanced 
and paid hy him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rate of ** of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15 Miner agrees that he will not commit or suffer to I* committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he mill maintain aaid premiaea in pood condition. 
JO In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof hy the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
anv ptivmcut or payment* when the same ahall Income due, or within 3 0 - days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remediea: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to renwdy the default within five days after written notire, 
to he reloaded fmnt all obligations m lav. and in equiU to convey said property, and all 'payments which have 
been made thereto/ore on this contract by the Huvei, ahall be forfeited to the Seller a« liquidated damage* for 
the linn-performance of the contract, and tin- Buvrr agrees that thr Si-ller may al his option re-enter and Uikc 
possessi' it ol aaid prrmisi-s without leghl processes nt- tit MR first and Inrmei estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made bv the Ituver ttiereou. and the said additions and improvements ahall remain with 
tin land become the property of th«- Sellei. the Huvrr hemming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. Tb< Seller may brine: suit and recover luarmeut for all delinquent iiMiallmcntfc. including cost* and attorney? 
feet (The use of this remedy on one or mure occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at ins option, from resoiling 
to one of the other remedies hcreund* r in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Sciier shall have the right, at his option, and upon wntten notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder al once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract a^ a note and mortgage, and paas 
title to the Hover subiect thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the anme in accordance with thr laws of 
the State ot Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied lo the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's feet;; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which mav remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of aaid mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the aame to the payment of the obturation hereunder, or hold thi aame pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, ahall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
37. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
IB. In the event there are any hens or encumbrances a pa mat said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to. or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for ahall hereafter accrue against the 
aame by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, nay and discharge the aame and receive credit 
on the amount then remainmp due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay. 
ments herein provided to be made, may. at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until auch time as such suspended 
puyments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
lf>. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the lime and in the manner above mentioned 
atrreet to rxecute and deliver to the Buyer or assi/rns. a pood and auflicicnt warranty deed conveymp the title lo the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of thr purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties heieto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically ael forth or attached hereto 
none 
21. The Buver and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pa> all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State ot Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filinp a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid arc to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
WITNESSiWHEREOF, the said parties lo this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year US V\ 11 K  1WIIEH-
firstfaCbve written! 
Signed in^lhe pfesetice of 
_^y - , j • * ' . ; • , . . * : 
Seller ' 
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Gordon A. Madsen #2048 
Attorney for Defendants 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT* OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through it's 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and Mary 
C. Wheaton, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFSXMOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civile/No. 920009436CV 
Jjrage: Robin W. Reese 
) 
) ss, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON, upon his oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the Defendants named in the above-
entitled action, and aver the facts set out below from my own 
direct knowledge. 
2. That I fully performed my duties under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs' Complaint, making 
the final payment May 18, 1989 as demonstrated by the attached 
statement of Draper Bank, marked Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by reference as though set out in full. 
3. The Third District court in the case involving the 
same Plaintiffs and Defendants, Civil No. C-89-3339, Judge Richard 
H. Moffat, presiding, in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, stated at Finding #6. 
"The Uniform Real Estate Contract has been paid in 
full." 
A copy of the court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are 
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
reference as though set out in full. 
4. While those Findings and the Judgment attached to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum make it obvious, I further state that my 
Answer filed in that action alleged full performance of the 
contract by me, and Plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and 
that issue was directly tried by the District court, giving rise to 
the above-quoted Finding. 
Subscribed and sworn to Defore me, a Notary Public this 
16th day of October, 1992. 
1 J^Z"* ^"'"i>S. 
1 y&^^z/^r 
1 ^ ^ s i y . l d * ^ 
L:o... ; i OJUC I 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
My Cc:r.,Tission Expires 1 
August 3,1996 1 
KIMBERLY WRIGHT 1 
U7North200West 1 
SaftUke Cay, Utah 84103 | 
^v&^jrf/O jtfhjtr 
5TARY PUJ3LI 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
to David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for 
Plaintiffs, at their address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 16th day of October, 
1992 
^ / ^ -
Buyer.. 
John C Josephson 
8560 Danish Rd 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
942-3338 
*s n M r c K 
cr T • u$ T 
0»4»f« UTAH 
¥?a*£ 
8500 Danish Rd 
sandy, Utah—ff4tmr-
Contract Amount 13, 830.00 Payment. 110,00 
Principal 
& Interest 
Unpaid Balance. 
Interest 8% 
Escrow . 
S/C Buyer. 
At 
Seller 5.00 
Date of Contract 
Interest From 
Checking 82-00748-5 
Savings 
C/C At. 
105.00 
OTHER DISBURSEMENT: 
d a y s c h a r g e ' 5 . 0 0 l a t e charge" 
ACCOUNT NO.. 
ATE PAYMENT ESCROW INTEREST AMOUNT PAID TO S/C 
TAX& 
INSURANCE MISC PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
•9-87 
•15-81 
•11-8 
87 ) - l -
28-8 
L-88 
-88 
5-88 
1-88 
27-881 
460.00 
575.00 
230.00 
225.00 
110.00 
225.06 
345.00 
225.00 
230.00 
455.00 
2-89 
3-89 
i in 
220.00 
97.79 
f u l l 
79.19 
86.75 
28.40 
25.72 
11.53 _ 
21.82 
28.77 
15.15 
12.42 
19.32 
2-10-87 
7-10- 8 
9-10-87 
11-101 
12-10-8 
late 
late 
2.02 
1.90 
Jt-10-88 
5-10-88 
7-10-88 
9-10-88 
t!P_~i9_ 
2-10-89 
5-18-89 
1-87 
' late 
late 5 
late 
late 5 
late 
late 15| 
10.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
L00 
b.oo 
00 
IP 00 
00 
losing fee 
365.18 
473.25 
201.60 
199.28 
93.47 
198.18 
301.23 
204.85 
207.58 
420.68 
85.89 
-r) ttcsJZsV- "b\ t I 
2603.99 
2130.74 
1929.14 
1729.86 
1636.39 
1-38.21 
1136.98 
932.13 
724.55 
303.87 
85,8 o?8o 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Defendants 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
Telephone 322-1141 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B., 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the 
19th day of June, 1991, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
District Court Judge. The plaintiffs appeared in person and 
by and through their attorneys, David K. Broadbent and Sally 
McMinimee, and the defendants appeared in person and by and 
through their attorney, Robert C. Cummings. The Court heard the 
opening arguments of counsel and the evidence presented during 
plaintiffs' case in chief, and the parties stipulated with regard 
to certain testimony as set forth in the record, and the parties 
having further stipulated that tne matter of attorneys fees be 
reserved for determination after the trial. The defendants made a 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-89-3339 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
-/ ^JX>Ms&'7 ''£> " 
motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case in 
chief, and the court determined that, based upon the facts and 
law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their Complaint 
and determined that defendants are entitled to the right-of-way as 
hereinafter set forth, and the matter of attorney's fees having 
been presented by affidavit and argument of counsel for the 
parties conducted on October 25, 1991, and the Court, being 
advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OP FACT: 
1. On or about April 6, 1973, the plaintiffs1 
predecessors, Douglas B* and Alice H. Covington, for a good and 
valuable consideration executed and delivered to defendants an 
Option, copy of which was entered into evidence at the trial as 
Defendants' Exhibit 5. 
2. The last paragraph of the Option states: 
"There will be an access R/W conveyed which is to be 
described just south of Covington Drive Way." 
3. On May 4, 1973, plaintiffs' said predecessors, 
Douglas B. Convington and his wife, Alice H. Covington, as 
sellers, and the defendants, as buyers, entered into a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Defendants' Exhibit 6), whereby sellers sold 
to buyers, and buyers purchased from sellers, the following-
described tract of land in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, U:ah: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 feet 
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Tow-snip 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running 
thence North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet to a point on 
an old barbed wire fenceline; thence North 86° 34' 10" 
fcest 265.41 fee-; thence South 20° 15'East 555.567 feet 
to the South line of ssid Section 35; thence along said 
South line South 89° 54" 10" East 74.17 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Together with 5 srares of Big Willow Irrigation Company 
water stock. 
4. On May 4, 1973, and as a part of the same 
transaction as that referred to in paragraph 3 above, plaintiffs1 
predecessor, Douglas B. Covington, and defendant, John C. 
Josephson, entered into a written Addendum to said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (Defendants' Exhibit 7) which provided as follows: 
"With regard to the Uniform Real Estate contract by and 
between Douglas Covington and Jon C. Josephson, a right 
of way from Danish Road to the North side of the subject 
property shall be added to the uniform real estate 
contract when legal description is obtained." 
5. The Court finds that, by virtue of said Uniform 
Real Estate Contract and said Addendum, the parties intended that 
the defendants receive a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress to 
and egress from the tract referred to in paragraph 3 of these 
Findings over a tract retained by the sellers (which tract is 
described in paragraph 12 of these Findings) extending from Danish 
Road and entering the tract being purchased by defendants through 
an entrance-way on the North side of said tract being purchased by 
defendants located between two small existing buildings, the West 
boundary of which entrance-way is located 125 feet, more or less, 
from the East boundary of said tracts. 
--*-
6. The Uniform Real Estate Contract has been paid in 
full. 
7. At the time of the aforesaid sale, Douglas B. 
Covington and Alice H. Covington owned the property as joint 
tenants. Douglas B. Covington died in 1987, and the said Alice H. 
Covington predeceased him. 
8. After the aforesaid sale the said Douglas B. 
Covington and Alice H. Covington, his wife, and the defendants 
entered into an exchange of property with Thomas F. English and 
Carene S. English, his wife, resulting in minor modifications to 
the tract sold to the defendants as aforesaid and which exchange 
is not in dispute in this action. Said changes are reflected in 
the legal description set out in paragraph 9 of these Findings. 
9. The defendants and their heirs and assigns forever 
are the owners in fee simple of, and entitled to possession of, 
the following-described real property in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
to-wit: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1320 feet 
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running 
thence North 0° 10f 23" West 505*475 feet to a point on 
an old barbed wire fence line; thence North 86° 34* 10" 
West along an existing fence line 265.41 feet; tr -nee 
South "20u IS1Past 555.567 feetto the South line of said 
Secticn 35; thence along said South line South 89° 54' 
10" East 74.17 feet to the point of beginning. 
Less the following-described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 1374.47 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 89* 54' 10" West 10.88 feet; thence 
North 20° 15' West 155.99 feet to the Southeast corner 
of Lot 12, Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence North 20° 
15' Wes- 317.95 feet to the Northeast corner of Lot 10, 
Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence South 89° 42' 07" East 
12.03 feet to fence line; thence South 19° 56f East 
along fence line 315.93 feet; thence South 20° 30f East 
along fence line 156.57 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with the following described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 1320.00 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 89° 54' 10" West 54.47 feet to 
fence line; thence South 20° 30' East along fence line 
6.41 feet to fence corner; thence South 89° 54' 10" East 
along fence line 52.24 feet; thence North 0° 10' 23" 
West 6.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress to 
and egress from the aforesaid tracts^ over the property retained by 
plaintiffs1 predecessors, which is now owned by plaintiffs and 
which is described in paragraph 12 of these Findings. 
10. With respect to the location of the said non-
exclusive right-of-way, the parties have stipulated that the said 
non-exclusive right-of-way referred to in the preceding paragraph 
9 shall be located as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 
feet and North 0° 10• 23" West 505.475 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 
86° 34' 10" West alone r>~ ^ v^^i*^ *anro i i nP 125 feet, more 
or less, to the west bcuncry cf existing entrance way to 
defendants' property described in paragraph 9 above; thence 
North 0° 10'* 23" West 15 feet; thence South 86° 34' 10" East 
125 feet, more or less, to the East bcundry of plaintiffs' 
property described in paragraph 12 below; thence South 0° 10f 
23" East 15 feet to the point of beginning. 
If plaintiffs or their heirs or assigns forever elect to 
maintain a locked gate across said right-of-way, a key 
thereto will be furnished at all times by the party 
-5-
maintaining said locked gate to defendants and their 
heirs and assigns forever. 
11. The defendants are owners of five shares of The 
Big Willow Irrigation Company water stock, which shares have been 
delivered to them. 
12. Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever are 
the owners in fee simple of, and entitled to possession of, the 
following-described real property, subject only to the right-of-
way referred to in paragraph 10 above: 
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 
1320.00 feet and North 00° 10* 23" West 505.475 feet 
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence North 86° 34' 10" West along an fisting 
fAnr^ linp 265.41 feet; thence North 20° 15' 00" West 
312.53 feet; thence South 89° 54' 19" East 372.18 feet; 
thence South 00° 10• 23" East 308.48 feet to the point 
of Beginning. 
13. It is reasonable that the defendants be awarded 
attorney's fees incurred by them in connection with this 
proceeding in the sum of $4,000.00, together with their costs 
of court in the sum of $74.00., 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1- The defendants are entitled to the judgment and 
decree of this court adjudging that they are owners in fee simple 
absolute of the real property described in paragraph 9 of the 
foreaoing Findings of Fact, free and clear of any claim of the 
plaintiffs. 
-6-
2. The defendants are entitled to judgment and decree 
cf this cc^rt adjudging that they have a non-exclusive right-of-
way described in paragraph 10 of the Findings cf Fact for ingress 
to and egress from said tract across the property retained by the 
plaintiffs and which is described in paragraph 12 of the Findings 
of Fact. 
3. The defendants are entitled to judgment in the sum 
of $4,000.00 attorney's fees and their costs of court of $74-00. 
DATED this ifo day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
The foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Approved as to form: 
DAVID H. BROADBENT 
SALLEY McMINIMEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs ill {$ fat 
S 5: »J L= i * L: t/ 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
 Q _ ^ 
Attorney «t LAW OUll d )^ IV^V. £* ' * 
2 2 5 S O U T H S E C O N D E A S T * * * 
SAX.TLAKE CITY, UTAH 04111 ' ' ' '* • * ~ • - ' - M ^ 
TELEPHONE 
June 22, 1992 <eoi)322-H4i 
Ms. Sally McMinimee 
Mr. David Broadbent 
Attorneys at Law 
175 East 4th South #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Mr. John Josephson 
Dear Sally and David: 
I spoke with John and told him that the figures on the taxes were 
coming. I also forwarded to him Daye^s letter outlining the 
amounts, but I find that John is/$ur'of town for a few weeks. I 
will make contact as soon as I can and get back to you. 
Thank you. 
Very t r u l ^ tfours, 
ROBERTV/C. CUMMINGS 
3a 
6F 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
/POJ 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
The Estate of DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil NO./920009436CV 
Judge/Robin W. Reese 
Plaintiff's and Defendants' cross-motions for summary 
judgment came before the Court on January 4, 1993. Based upon 
its review of the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the 
parties and arguments of counsel, and the Court finding that 
there are no genuine issues of fact, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby 
granted, and defendants' motion is denied. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendants, John C. and Geraldine Josephson, in the amount of 
$3,370.70, together with costs in the amount of $ i 1> t ^ ' '} and 
attorneys fees in the amount of $ 1 (Z7 > ^ , and interest on 
the sum of $3,440.70 at the contract rate of 3/4 of one percent 
per month from May 8, 1992 until the date hereof, and interest on 
the total judgment at the statutory judgment rate of twelve 
percent per annum thereafter until paid. 
4. The judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit. 
DATED this I I day of J**wa€ery, 1993. 
BY THE eomrzt 
i • hrf t , _ , r „ m . I f i . • ^ ^ i f . r 
ROBIN W. REESE 
Circuit Court Judge 
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